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WHAT MAKES PRACTICAL REASON LAW-LIKE?
MICHAEL J. WHITE*
ONE of the many signal services performed by John Finnis in his mag-isterial Natural Law and Natural Rights1 is his destruction of a number
of myths concerning the relation—supposedly “according to the natural
law tradition”—between natural law and positive law.  In these relatively
brief comments, I propose to explore the relation between two other spe-
cies of law (lex) distinguished by Aquinas: lex aeterna and lex naturalis.  I
shall suggest that Professor Finnis’s notion of practical rationality can most
plausibly be conceived of as law-like only if his particular notion of practical
reasonableness (about which more later) stands in a heteronomous relation
to something like Aquinas’s lex aeterna.  I shall also maintain that such a
heteronomous relation seems to presuppose a metaphysical perspective
that is, in some sufficiently broad sense, teleological.  In order to forestall
any possible misunderstanding, I emphasize that I am using the adjective
“heteronomous” in its etymological sense: “subject to a standard external
to itself” and not in the specifically Kantian sense of “acting in accordance
with one’s desires rather than in accordance with reason or moral duty.”
For the ancient philosophical antecedents of Aquinas’s conception of
lex aeterna, we need to look to Stoicism, and perhaps Stoicizing Platonism,
rather than to Aristotle.  However orderly, intelligible, and immutably nec-
essary Aristotle’s world (at least the supralunary part of it) may be, Aris-
totle exhibits no inclination to regard that order, intelligibility, and
immutable necessity as a function of anything like nomos (the Greek term
rendered as “(positive) law”, “custom,” or “convention”).  For, whatever
cosmic potency his deities may exercise as unmoved movers, and whatever
wisdom they may possess as thought thinking itself, this power and this
knowledge is not analogized to the power and knowledge of human rulers
governing their poleis (“civic communities”) by the rule of positive law.2
For one thing, the Aristotelian deities do not engage in any form of practi-
cal activity; for another, they do not share in what Aristotle calls the eˆthikai
areˆtai, the moral virtues (nor, of course, in the moral vices).
The requisite analogy is certainly found, however, among the Stoics
and those whom they influenced.  The idea of divine reason pervading the
* Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University.
1. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (Oxford Univ. Press, 2d
ed. 2011) (1980).
2. While it is true that Aristotle, at Rhetoric I, 13 famously speaks of “natural
justice” and “universal law” as a “natural law,” it is not clear that he means to indi-
cate more in these terms than a supposedly universal empirical agreement with
respect to a certain “core” of moral and legal issues.  Unlike Plato before him and
the Stoics after him, he does not, in any extant text, spell out a metaphysical or
theological rationale for this moral/legal agreement concerning core issues.
(911)
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universe and ruling it as a cosmopolis, in an orderly, intelligible, and immu-
tably necessary manner, is at the heart of Stoic physical theory.  As Cicero,
wearing his Stoic hat in his work De legibus (On the Laws) puts it:
[W]hen that same mind [which has pursued the path of “perceiv-
ing and recognizing the virtues”] examines the heavens, the
earth, the sea, and the nature of all things, and perceive where
those thing have come from and to where they will return, when
and how they are due to die, what part of them is mortal and
perishable, and what is divine and everlasting; and when it almost
apprehends the very good who governs and rules them, and real-
izes that it itself is not a resident in some particular locality sur-
rounded by man-made walls, but a citizen of the whole world as
though it were a single city; then, in the majesty of these sur-
roundings, in this contemplation and comprehension of nature,
great God!  how well it will know itself, as the Pythian Apollo
commanded . . . .3
It is this cosmic Reason-with-an-upper-case-’R’ that Cicero invokes in
his definition of law:
[L]aw is the highest reason, inherent in nature [lex est ratio
summa, insita in natura], which enjoins what ought to be done
and forbids the opposite.  When that reason is fully formed and
completed in the human mind, it, too, is law.4
I take it that the reason that is “formed and completed (confirmata et
perfecta) in the human mind” is Cicero’s version of law as practical reason
as lex naturalis, in Aquinas’s sense.  But it is clear that Cicero believes that
practical reason in this sense is heteronomous.  It does not, as it were,
define itself; rather, it is grounded in the “ratio summa, insita in natura.”
St. Thomas introduces his conception of lex aeterna in the second arti-
cle of the so-called “Treatise on Law”:
[A] law is nothing else but a dictate of practical reason emanat-
ing from the ruler who governs a perfect community.  Now it is
evident, granted that the world is ruled by Divine Providence. . .
that the whole community of the universe is governed by Divine
Reason (tota communitas universi gubernatur ratione divina).
Wherefore the very idea of the government of things in God the
Ruler of the universe, has the nature of law.5
3. CICERO, Laws, in THE REPUBLIC AND THE LAWS 61119 (Niall Rudd trans.,
Oxford Univ.Press 1998).
4. Id. at 103.
5. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE IaIIae q. 91, a. 1(Marietti Editori Ltd.
1952).
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God’s providential rule of the universe is glossed by Aquinas in terms
of the notion of rationes (“reasons”—or “types” in the translation by the
English Dominican Fathers6), which bear a strong resemblance to Platonic
ideai (“Ideas”, “Forms”) and Stoic logoi spermatikoi (“rational seeds”):
Just as in every artificer there pre-exists a type [ratio] of the things
that are made by his art, so too in every governor there must pre-
exist the type of the order of those things that are to be done by
those who are subject to his government.  And just as the type of
the things yet to be made by an art is called the art or exemplar
of the products of that art, so too the type in him who governs
the acts of his subjects, bears the character of a law . . . .  Where-
fore as the type of the Divine Wisdom, inasmuch as by It all
things are created, has the character of art, exemplar or idea; so
the type of Divine Wisdom, as moving all things to their due end,
bears the character of law.  Accordingly the lex aeterna is nothing
other than the type of Divine Wisdom, as directing all actions
and movements. 7
Indeed, in this article, Aquinas quotes Augustine’s De libero arbitrio to
the effect that lex aeterna is the “highest reason” (summa ratio), using ex-
actly the Latin phrase that Cicero uses in the De legibus.  The significant
difference, of course, is that for Aquinas and Augustine, eternal law is
summa ratio in Deo existens (the highest reason existing in God).  In other
words, lex aeterna is insita in sapientia divina (inherent in the Divine wis-
dom) rather than, as Cicero would have it, insita in natura (inherent in
nature).
However, Cicero, Augustine, and Aquinas agree that law as summa ra-
tio is not inherent in human practical reason.  For Cicero, this summa ratio
is established (confirmata) in the human mind by what, in effect, is the
Stoic process of oikeioˆsis (a Stoic technical term: “sociation,” “appropria-
tion as one’s own,” “developing a moral perspective”) the ideal culmina-
tion of which—perhaps only attained by that avis rara the Stoic sage—is
described as follows:
Once the mind, on perceiving and recognizing the virtues, has
ceased to serve and gratify the body, and has expunged pleasure
as a kind of discreditable stain; and once it has put behind it all
fear of pain and death, and entered a loving fellowship with its
own kind, regarding as its own kind all who are akin to it by na-
ture, and once it has begun to worship the gods in a pure form of
religion, and has sharpened the edge of moral judgment, like
that of the eyes, so that it can choose the good and reject its
opposite (a virtue that is called “prudentia” from “providendum”)—
6. See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (Fathers of the English Domini-
can Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1948).
7. AQUINAS, supra note 5, at IaIIae q. 93, a. 1.
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what can be described or conceived as more blessed than such a
mind?8
For Aquinas, the “rational creature”:
[H]as a share of the eternal ratio, whereby it has a natural inclina-
tion to its proper act and end: and this participation of the lex
aeterna in the rational creature is called lex naturalis.9
Does Aquinas, then, identify the “participation” of lex aeterna in the
rational creature—which he here calls “lex naturalis”—with human (practi-
cal) reason?  It seems that the answer is negative.  To begin with, as Patrick
Brennan has reminded me, Aquinas suggests that God acts as an “extrinsic
principle moving to good (principium exterius movens at bonum)” through
both grace and the lex aeterna.  Aquinas also interprets an Aristotelian habit
(habitus) as “that by which one acts, when one wills to do so.”10  While
human reason is a power (potentia), “habits are qualities or forms adhering
to a power, and inclining that power to acts of a determinate species.”11
Among the habits of reason is synderesis: “so the first principles of actions,
which are naturally imposed on us, do not pertain to a special power, but
to a special natural habit, which we call synderesis.”12  Aquinas nonetheless
holds that, in the primary and proper sense, natural law is not a habitus but,
rather, “something decreed through reason, in the way that a proposition
is a certain operation of reason.”13
I wish to explore the hypothesis that Aquinas intends us to under-
stand that the source of those first principles of natural law that we appre-
hend by synderesis is lex aeterna, understood as a manifestation of divine
reason.  I shall further suggest that the salient feature by which human
practical reason can become natural law is precisely the heteronomy of these
principles—the fact that human practical reason does not itself construct
these principles through its own operation, to so speak, but rather receives
them “naturally” (naturaliter).
One very common account of practical reason, deriving from David
Hume, maintains that practical reason is concerned exclusively in devising
the necessary or most efficient means to externally given ultimate ends.
According to the Humean account “reason alone can never produce any
action, or give rise to volition . . .  Reason is, and ought only to be the slave
of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve
and obey them.”14  In radical reaction, Immanuel Kant concludes that
8. CICERO, supra note 3, at 118–19.
9. AQUINAS, supra note 5, at IaIIae q. 91, a. 2.
10. Id. at q. 50, a.1; cf. q. 94, a. 1.
11. Id. at q. 54, a. 1.
12. Id. at Ia q. 79, a. 12.
13. Id. at IaIIae q. 94, a. 1.
14. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE II.iii.3, at 414–15 (L. A. Selby-
Bigge ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1978).
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practical reason can be the source of ends.  Moreover, for these ends to be
“moral,” they must be capable of being expressed in universal principles
that the practical reason of the individual human agent himself or herself
legislates:
Thus morality consists in the relation of all action to the making
of laws whereby alone a kingdom of ends is possible.  This mak-
ing of laws must be found in every rational being himself and
must be able to spring from his will.  The principle of his will is
therefore never to perform an action except on a maxim such as
can also be a universal law, and consequently such that the will can
regard itself as at the same time making universal law by means of its
maxim.15
St. Thomas surely agrees with Kant–contra Hume–that practical rea-
son can itself both discern and impose certain kinds of categorical first
principles.  But, for the reasons I have adduced, I do not believe that he
agrees with Kant that natural law is autonomously legislated by human prac-
tical reason; rather, human practical reason discerns the requirements of
what Finnis terms “practical reasonableness” as a result of the “participa-
tion of the lex aeterna in the rational creature.”16
The basic forms of human good enumerated by Finnis are life, knowl-
edge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability (friendship), religion, and
practical reasonableness:
Moreover, there are countless aspects of human self-determina-
tion and self-realization besides the seven basic aspects which I
have listed.  But these other aspects, such as courage, generosity,
moderation, gentleness, and so on, are not themselves basic val-
ues; rather, they are ways (not means, but modes) of pursuing
the basic values, and fit (or are deemed by some individual, or
group, or culture, to fit) a man for their pursuit.17
“So it is,” Finnis concludes,
[T]hat the practical principles which enjoin one to participate in
those basic forms of good, through the practically intelligent de-
cisions and free actions that constitute one the person one is and
is to be, have been called in the Western philosophical tradition
the first principles of natural law, because they lay down for us
the outlines of everything one could reasonable want to do, to
have, and to be.18
15. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 101 (H. J.
Paton trans., Harper Torchbooks 1964).
16. AQUINAS, supra note 5, at IaIIae q. 91, a. 2.
17. FINNIS, supra note 1, at 90–91.
18. Id. at 97.
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I do indeed believe that it is quite plausible to regard six of Finnis’s
aspects of the good (excluding practical reasonableness) as fundamental
principles of “human self-determination and self-realization” and to re-
gard the free, determinate participation in them as constitutive of “the
person one is and is to be.”  These are substantive goods.  It is in the partic-
ular “blend”, as it were, of one’s participation in them that one uses one’s
practical reason to match one’s talents, opportunities, limitations, and pe-
culiar inclinations (and aversions) in determining what sort of life one will
live.
But what of the good of “practical reasonableness?”  As Finnis notes,
this is more of a procedural than substantive good.  It is
[P]articipated in precisely by shaping one’s participation in the
other basic goods, by guiding one’s commitments, one’s selec-
tion of projects, and what one does in carrying them out.
The principles that express the general ends of human life
do not acquire what would nowadays be called a “moral” force
until they are brought to bear upon definite ranges of project,
disposition, or action, or upon particular projects, dispositions,
or actions.  How they are thus to be brought to bear is the prob-
lem for practical reasonableness.  “Ethics”, as classically con-
ceived, is simply a recollectively and/or prospectively reflective
expression of this problem and of the general lines of solutions
which have been thought reasonable.19
I suggest that it is precisely with practical reasonableness, so con-
ceived, that practical rationality takes on the heteronomous character that
makes it law-like.  With respect to the substantive aspects of the human
goods, human freedom permits different “mixes.”  As Finnis notes, “[a]
certain scholar may have little taste or capacity for friendship, and may feel
that life for him would have no savour if he we were prevented from pursu-
ing his commitment to knowledge.”  He adds that, nonetheless, it would
be “stupid or arbitrary” for such a person “to think or speak or act as if
these [friendships, life ‘quite apart from truth-seeking and knowledge’]
were not real forms of good.”20
The situation strikes me as different with respect to the good of prac-
tical reasonableness, however.  With respect to the moral constraints that
it imposes, it would be nonsensical for a person to plead that, while he
recognizes that practical reasonableness is one of the “real forms of the
good,” he nonetheless has little personal “taste or capacity” for it and,
hence, intends to accord it only minimal significance in the living out of
his life.  I suggest that practical reasonableness in Finnis’s sense bears a
more than superficial likeness to the Stoic (and Ciceronian) conception of
to kalon or the honestum, that is, the distinctively moral good.  Two promi-
19. Id. at 100–01 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 105.
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nent questions in the ethical theorizing of later antiquity are the following:
Is the honestum (“[moral] virtue,” “rectitude,” “[moral] goodness”) an ulti-
mate good or is it, at most, a means?  If it is a final or ultimate good as
opposed to a means, is it the only ultimate good; or, rather, is it only one
ultimate good along with some other “natural” goods?  In the discussion of
these questions, as Julia Annas says, “the view that it [the ultimate end] is
getting natural goods and virtue is ascribed to Aristotle and the ‘Old Acad-
emy’ tradition.”21  And on one Ciceronian interpretation, the Stoic doc-
trine that, while the only ultimate good is the honestum, there is a class of
things that are naturally (and correctly) “preferred” (proeˆgomena, prae-
posita), amounts to the same thing (Cicero, De finibus IV, 42ff,).
However, once one has conceptualized practical reasonableness (con-
ceived here as the honestum) as procedural rather than substantive, it be-
comes almost obvious that there must be other, substantive human goods.
To live honeste is categorically necessary; but one cannot live a human life if
one resolves that “living virtuously” is all that matters in living one’s life–that
there are no other non-instrumental ends of human motivation.  “Doing
the virtuous thing in the circumstances” would seem to depend on one’s
having other, substantive motivations and final ends of action that supply
the possibility and the context, so to speak, of doing those things virtuously.
Furthermore, it seems that leading at least a reasonably virtuous life is
compatible with living a life that is otherwise stunted by (perhaps) insuffi-
cient attention to other fundamental substantive human goods in one’s
“life plan.”
A fascinating case is that of the heiress Huguette Clark, daughter of a
robber baron and sometime senator from Montana, who died not long
ago at the age of 104.  I obviously am not aware of the extent of Ms. Clark’s
moral virtuousness.  But it was reported that she was munificent to the very
few people who were close to her and contributed generously to many
philanthropic causes.  It seems to be at least consistent with the public
information about her that she lived what could be described as a morally
blameless life.  Since the late 1980s, she had lived in seclusion and under
fictitious names in several New York City hospitals.
By the late 1930s, Mrs. Clark had disappeared from the soci-
ety pages.  Most if not all of her siblings had died; she lived with
her mother at 907 Fifth Avenue, painting and playing the harp.
Her mother died there in 1963.
For the quarter-century that followed, Mrs. Clark lived in the
apartment in near solitude, amid a profusion of dollhouses and
their occupants.  She ate austere lunches of crackers and sardines
and watched television, most avidly “The Flintstones.”  A house-
keeper kept the dolls’ dresses impeccably ironed.
21. Julia Annas, Introduction to CICERO, ON MORAL ENDS xxv (Julia Annas ed.,
Raphael Woolf trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001).
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And so ran the rhythm of Mrs. Clark’s life until the day she
left for the hospital and checked herself in.  Fittingly for some-
one who worked so hard to remain an enigma, her reasons were
best known only to her.  They seem to have been born, relatives
have suggested in news accounts, of her dual desire for exquisite
solitude and exquisite care.22
It seems almost superfluous to comment that, however great may have
been Mrs. Clark’s participation in moral reasonableness in the narrow
sense—that is, however, honeste she may have lived—her life seems to be
deficient in terms of its practical rationality.  And what appears to be want-
ing is sufficient personal commitment to a reasonable range of the other,
substantive human goods.  Can one retain one’s “happiness” (in the nar-
row, Stoic sense of one’s moral goodness or honestas) during a lifetime
consisting largely of imprisonment with occasional torture on the rack?
Perhaps.  If so, one can probably also retain it while surrounded by expen-
sive dolls, eating sardines, and watching “The Flintstones” in an elegant
Fifth Avenue apartment.  But obviously something is amiss in both cases.
What is amiss, of course, is the element of practical rationality that is
involved in the self-determination of a reasonable human life—or perhaps
the opportunities to exercise that element of rationality.  Perhaps partly
because of the variety of apparent options open to many persons in the
affluent and socially mobile world of contemporary “first-world” societies,
the element of rational self-determination has figured largely in Rawlsian
liberal political theory in concepts such as one’s subjective “comprehen-
sive conception of the good.”  Rawls’s notion of reasonableness, while no-
tably “thinner” than that of Professor Finnis, is an essentially moral notion
of reciprocity: “the particular form of moral sensibility that underlies the
desire to engage in fair cooperation as such, and to do so on terms that
others as equals might reasonably be expected to endorse.”23  While the
commitment to the value of this sort of reciprocity is certainly an element
of practical reasonableness, it is not the sum and substance of it.24
I am inclined to believe, malgre´ Kant, that the constraints of practical
reasonableness in the specifically moral sense of that phrase are no more
susceptible to individual “balancing,” in their relation to other substantive
aspects of the human good, than they are to individual construction or
self-imposition.  I propose that the heteronomous character of the moral
aspect of practical rationality is essential in imparting to practical rationality
its law-like character.  The conception of “imposing a law on oneself” or
“legislating for oneself” I take to be at best a potentially misleading meta-
phor—rather like “promising oneself,” “forgiving oneself,” or perhaps
even “apologizing to oneself.”
22. Margalit Fox, Huguette Clark, Reclusive Heiress, Dies at 104, N.Y. TIMES, May
25, 2011, at A1.
23. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 51 (Columbia Univ. Press 1993).
24. Cf. FINNIS, supra note 1, at 105–09.
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If the honestum, practical reasonableness in Finnis’s sense, is a categor-
ical but procedural good—a good which is not, as it were, internally
fabricated by human rationality reflecting on the other, substantive aspects
of the human good—then it must in some sense be imposed from with-
out.”  Aquinas, as we have seen, holds that it is grounded in the lex aeterna.
Finnis makes the plausible suggestion that the participatio of the lex aeterna
in the rational creature, which Aquinas identifies with natural law, ulti-
mately cashes out in terms of the two ideas of causation and similarity:
A quality that an entity or state of affairs has or includes is partici-
pated, in Aquinas’s sense, if that quality is caused by a similar qual-
ity which some other entity or state of affairs has or includes in a
more intrinsic or less dependent way.25
I would add the idea of hierarchy, which I think is implicit in the
phrase “has or includes in a more intrinsic or less dependent way.”  By this
term, I intend both a natural hierarchy of value and obligation external to
the human person and a certain authority ipso facto imposed on rational
beings by their recognition of that hierarchy.
So, to conclude, it seems to me that, insofar as practical reason as-
sumes a law-like character (which would result in something like Aquinas’s
conception of practical reason as natural law), it must derive that charac-
ter heteronomously—from an external cause that itself exemplifies ration-
ality and stands in an hierarchical order that gives that cause a natural
authority over the individual person’s practical rationality.  While this is
obviously a heavily metaphysical concept, I believe that it is broad enough
to include the God of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, the Good/Forms/
Demiurge of Plato, and the cosmically immanent Reason of Cicero and
the Stoics.
Of course, a very different and probably nowadays statistically more
prevalent metaphysics is poetically described by Bertrand Russell: from no
rational perspective can the universe be regarded as anything more than
an “alien and inhuman world” that is “purposeless, . . . void of meaning”
and the “outcome of accidental collocations of atoms [and, in some of its
local aspects, of evolutionary processes].”26  From such a metaphysical per-
spective, one certainly might construct a conception of human practical
rationality.  But such a conception could never, I submit, possess the dis-
tinctively law-like character of Aquinas’s natural law or Finnis’s practical
rationality.
To my mind, Professor Finnis has succeeded in establishing that the
relation between natural law and positive law (lex humana) should not be
conceptualized as the relation of blue-print to completed edifice:
25. Id. at 399.
26. BERTRAND RUSSELL, A Free Man’s Worship, in MYSTICISM AND LOGIC AND
OTHER ESSAYS 41 (Barnes and Noble Books 1981) (1917).
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These “general principles of law” are indeed principles.  That is
to say, they justify, rather than require, particular rules and deter-
minations, and are qualified in their application to particular cir-
cumstances by other like principles.  Moreover, any of them may
on occasion be outweighed and overridden (which is not the
same as violated, amended, or repealed) by other important
components of the common good, other principles of jus-
tice . . . .  Still, the general principles of law which have been
recited here, do operate, over vast ranges of legislative determina-
tiones, to modify the pursuit of particular social goods.27
Neither, it seems clear, does lex aeterna stand in relation to natural law
as blue-print to edifice.  Yet, just as natural law properly exercises a heter-
onomous constraint on positive law, so I submit lex aeterna stands as an
external constraint on practical reason, a constraint that imparts to practi-
cal reason its law-like character.
But what do I mean by “law-like character?”  The short but intention-
ally ambiguous answer is that something has a law-like character just in
case it possesses a sufficient resemblance to what I take to be law in its
paradigmatic sense—that is, human positive law.  I take it that human pos-
itive law presents, in Aristotelian terms, the manifestation of law that is
most clear to us as “being law.”  And I believe that Aquinas would agree.
However, he also holds that all the kinds of law that he considers in the
“Treatise on Law” fully exemplify the same concept.  That is, he believes
that the noun “lex” is used synonymously in all the cases of positive law,
eternal law, natural law, and divine law, although I believe that he has
some trouble in evising plausible arguments for this claim in the case of
eternal and natural law.
In contrast to Aquinas, Professor Finnis suggests that “law” is used
analogously, with positive law providing the prime analogate.  While I am
not taking a position on this issue, I do maintain that what I have termed
the heteronomous character of law is important to understanding not only
the nature of positive law but that of other kinds of law—or of “law” in its
analogous senses, particularly the nature of practical reason conceptual-
ized as natural law.  I would also suggest that the recognition of a law-like
character of practical reason is a necessary first step in seeing ourselves in
a creaturely mode (and, ultimately, in coming to understand our divine fili-
ation).  But it is only the first step in that much longer journey, which it is
not my business to discuss here today.
27. FINNIS, supra note 1, at 288.
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